"Double Jeopardy"

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In sensation early case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, a suspect was tried and gyped of usurpation and battery for hitting and the boot a victim. A few weeks after this conviction, the victim died from his injuries. At that point, the brass charged the defendant with homicide and convicted him. In response to the defendant's woo on double jeopardy grounds, the Supreme Court verbalize that attack-battery and homicide were two distinct offenses even if they arose out of the same incident. composition both offenses contained several similar elements, in order to convict the defendant of homicide, the state had to prove the additional element of the destruction of the victim. In fact, this was the principal element of the offense. The state did non endeavor to do this at the first trial because the victim had not yet died. Gabriel Diaz v. unite States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1911).

There are several Texas cases which eat up reached the same conclusion. The earliest of these cases was decided in 1886. In that case, the defendant accidentally shot the victim while celebrating Christmas 1885. The defendant was convicted of exacerbate assault in January 1886; the victim died from kidney disease which resulted from his wounds in April 1886; the defendant was then tried for and convicted of second degree execution of instrument in July 1886. The Texas Court of Appeals held that a c

join States v. Talkington, 589 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1978).

United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).

onviction for assault cannot bar an indictment for murder if the victim is still alive at the time of the assault conviction. The court cited the reasoning of a Scottish court, where the judge express that the crime of murder does not exist until the victim dies. As a result, a defendant convicted of assault can ulterior be tried and convicted of murder if the victim dies after the assault conviction. The death of the victim creates a new crime. Curtis v. State, 3 S.W. 86, 87-88 (Tx. Ct of App. 1886).

Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).

United States v. Stop Six Center, 781 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Tex. 1991).

In United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S.

Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court held that a benefactive role qualified as an owner chthonian the statute. In that case, a dose dealer made a gift of $240,000 to his girlfriend. She apply the money to purchase the home which later became the subject of the sacrifice proceedings. She lived at this home with her children. The District Court of New island of Jersey determined that there was probable cause to believe that the money used to purchase the home were proceeds from illegal drug trafficking in which the dealer was engaged. The girlfriend claimed that she was unaware of the activities and was therefore absolve under(a) the innocent owner defense. The government argued that the girlfriend was not an owner under the statute since the statute afforded protection under the defense to bona fide purchasers only. The Supreme Court, however, held that a donee did come under the definition of an owner under the statute since the statute ne'er qualified the definition of an owner. 113 S. Ct. at 1134.

United States v. 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1987).

The government also argued that the girlfriend was not an owner because the statute vested will power of the proper
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